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Abstract 
The question of whether and when to enter a newly emerging product market has been 
the focus of practitioners as well as researchers. This paper contributes to the literature by 
investigating the order of entry as well as pre-entry experiences with a population-based 
approach for the radically new product market of multifunctional machine tools for the 
case of Germany between 1949 and 2002. Estimation results show, that later entrants 
outperform pioneers. Moreover, it turns out that industry and technology specific 
capabilities do not increase survival chances. But when decomposing the known positive 
age effect on survival, we see that particularly dynamic capabilities, i.e. the competence 
to integrate additional business activities into the current product portfolio, significantly 
lower the risk of failure in the new product market.  
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I. Introduction         
Technological progress often confronts market participants with the question, of whether, 
and even more importantly, when to enter newly emerging product markets. A substantial 
body of empirical literature comes to the conclusion that pioneering entrants are able to 
achieve a so called first mover advantage, and therefore early entry into a new market 
should be preferred over delayed entry (Agarwal, 1997; Klepper, 1997; Lieberman and 
Montgomery, 1988; Shepherd, 1999). But examples as being witnessed in the 
semiconductor industry highly challenge this maxim of “be[ing] the first to develop 
tomorrow’s technology and you’ll dominate tomorrow’s markets” (Olleros, 1986, p.7). 
Whereas firms such as General Electric, RCA and Hughes led and accomplished the 
technology’s commercialization, later entrants like Texas Instruments, Fairchild 
Semiconductor, and Intel grew into leadership positions next to the sizable incumbents 
AT&T and IBM. Moreover, it is frequently argued that industry dynamics lead to a 
shakeout of smaller firms when technologies become more and more standardized and 
large-scale, process focused production procedures favor firms above a certain minimum 
size within the price competition of maturing sectors. But again, this explanation does 
neither apply for the presented case nor does it account for other instances of pioneer 
burnouts such as in sewing machines, typewriters, and transistors (ibid). A common 
feature of all these examples though is that each of these markets represents the 
consequence of radically new technologies as opposed to incremental innovations. Thus, 
within the context of entering a newly emerging market the characteristics of the product 
relative to existing technologies are equally decisive for the entrants’ success. Whereas 
these product and market related considerations constitute a solid ground for entry 
decision making, the other side of the coin, namely business internal competencies, play 
an equally important role for the success within a new market. Therefore, theoretical as 
well as empirical studies have addressed the issue of pre-entry experience of competitors 
in new markets (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002; Klepper, 2002; Buenstorf, 2007). It is 
argued that firms already possessing similar resources, in terms of capabilities, with 
respect to the new market will be more successful than their less experienced 
competitors. In particular, diversifying firms as well as spin-offs outperform de novo 
entrants (see also Mitchell, 1991; Klepper and Simons, 2000) as they could mainly rely 
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on technological experience from related industries. But in addition to these technological 
capabilities it is argued that generally older firms tend to have a lower risk of failure as 
they accumulated general capabilities which are mainly related to organizational and 
management tasks. 
Based on these findings on entry timing and pre-entry experience the present paper 
investigates the question how both factors, entry timing and different types of initial 
capabilities, affect survival rates in a radically new emerging market, i.e. the market for 
multifunctional machine tools. Moreover, we ask the question whether entry into this 
state of the art market guaranteed long-term survival in the industry. The empirical event 
history analysis is based on a dataset encompassing the entire firm population of machine 
tool producers between 1949 and 2002. The main result of the paper confirms previous 
theoretical and empirical studies by finding that within this radically new market, general 
capabilities lower the risk of failure whereas specific technological pre-experience does 
not affect the likelihood of long-term success within the new product segment. It turns 
out that when decomposing the set of general capabilities it is no longer the pure fact of 
being older and larger that lowers a firm’s risk of failure, but it is particularly the 
experience of having already managed to integrate a new business activity into the 
product portfolio that increases survival chances in the market under investigation. 
Moreover, we find that later entrants benefit from technological discontinuities within the 
new market as well as a delayed replacement cycle within the industry and are thus able 
to outperform pioneering entrants. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section we discuss the 
theoretical background of the paper. Subsequently, section III introduces the empirical 
setting, before we present our empirical estimation strategy and data in section IV. 
Estimation results are given in section V and section VI concludes.   
 
II. Theoretical background 
The relation between order of market entry and the success of a firm is crucial for 
understanding industry dynamics, but empirical results on the existence of a pioneer’s 
advantage in new markets are highly controversial. Therefore, this section summarizes 
the theoretical and empirical considerations with respect to first mover advantages and 
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the conditions under which later entrants are expected to outperform pioneers. Within this 
context we refer to market pioneers as firms entering a new market first in line with 
Robinson and Fornell (2985, p.305).  
            
II.1. First-mover advantages  
The central argument within the discussion on first mover advantages is based on the 
concept of entry barriers (Bain, 1956). Shaw and Shaw (1984) argue in this respect that 
early entrants derive an advantage from the “learning” or “experience” curve as costs fall 
with cumulative output. Therefore, pioneers are able to generate a sustainable cost 
advantage, but only if this accumulated knowledge can be kept proprietary (Spence, 
1981) e.g. via patenting (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982; Reinganum, 1983), and pioneers 
can thus continue establishing high market shares (Robinson and Fornell, 1985). But 
given the high workforce mobility, research publications, informal communications and 
especially reverse engineering, technological leadership is rather short-lived nowadays 
(Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Mansfield, 1985; Lieberman, 1982). Moreover, 
Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) argue that next to technological leadership, first 
mover advantages may arise from preemption of scarce assets such as buying natural 
resource deposits before market prices are driven up or from entering the market at the 
most attractive location including e.g. securing exclusive (local) supply channels. The 
strategic positioning either based on product or geographic space leads to the 
unprofitability of the remaining space for later entrants (cf. Prescott and Visscher, 1977; 
Schmalensee, 1978).  
Considering also a consumer based line of reasoning, being first to the market certainly 
allows a firm to confront customers with their version of the new product. Thereby, 
pioneers gain recognition and reputation in the new market place, and profit from the fact  
that consumers tend to prefer buying pioneering brand products once they have proven 
their functionality (Lane and Wiggins, 1981; Schmalensee, 1982; Urban et al, 1986). On 
top of this brand loyalty pioneering products may emerge as the standard (Wernerfelt and 
Karnani, 1987), thus shaping consumer’s perception of competing products and their 
features (Carpenter and Nakamoto (1989). Therefore, later entrants will have to attract 
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customers away from the pioneering product, which is likely to entail high switching 
costs (Wernerfelt, 1985). 
Besides the prominent empirical support by Agarwal (1997), and Agarwal and Gort 
(1996) for the existence of first mover advantages, studies by Biggadike (1976), Dillon et 
al (1979) and Shaw and Shaw (1984) confirm this phenomenon for 40 respectively 174 
industrial goods as well as the Western Europe synthetic fiber industry. In all cases 
pioneering in the market was the main source of long-term success within a new market. 
The same live-prolonging effect of early entry holds for consumer goods industries as 
investigated for the prescription drug industry (Bond and Lean, 1977) and the cigarette 
market (Whitten, 1979). Moreover, Robinson and Fornell (1985) found that pioneers in 
consumer goods industries tend to have higher quality products, broader product lines 
and stronger distribution supports.  
 
II.2. Pioneer burnout 
But on the other hand there is also empirical evidence for exactly the opposite scenario, 
i.e. under specific circumstances delayed entry proofs to be more beneficial than 
pioneering initiatives (e.g. Lambkin and Day, 1989; Golder and Tellis, 1993). Especially 
Olleros (1986) draw the attention to the phenomenon of “pioneers’ burnout” in emerging 
industries such as typewriters, transistors or the semiconductor industry. The two most 
striking reasons for pioneering disadvantages are in this context, first, the high 
development costs for a new product and the market, and second, the accompanied risk of 
not being rewarded for this high initial investment as later entrants imitate the product at 
lower costs and thus free ride on the pioneers efforts (Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner, 
1981). Within this debate Wernerfelt and Karnani (1987) as well as Min et al (2006) 
argue that the nature of the product, its characteristics and the implied market uncertainty 
are the decisive factor of whether pioneers are superior to later entrants. In the case of 
incrementally new products, pioneers face a situation of established customer needs and 
technologies and are therefore confronted with a situation of comparably low risk and 
uncertainty. Combined with the possibility to benefit from continuously accumulating 
experience, pioneers should outperform later entrants. In case of radically new products 
in contrast, Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) point out that there are immense market 
5
 #0922 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
uncertainties in terms of a proper technological solution as well as unknown or changing 
customer preferences. In particular, products that “shift market structures, represent new 
technologies, require consumer learning, and induce behavior changes” (Urban et al, 
1996, p. 47) are confronted with slow adaption by consumers as they have to learn and 
accept the new technology, probably wait for a standard to emerge, and often rely on 
complementary hardware or software (Min et al, 2006). Given these uncertainties, 
pioneers are less likely to make sizable investments to achieve scale effects that 
ultimately lead to the presented size benefits (Kerin et al, 1992). Furthermore, later 
entrants can profit from the later on resolved technological uncertainties and thus build 
their success exactly on these early day technological discontinuities (Scherer, 1980). A 
last argument in favor of first mover disadvantages in radically new product markets 
stems from the population ecology literature, which argues that firms suffer from inertia, 
i.e. firms cannot change after the blueprint of the organization including the technological 
core competence has been established (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). But it could 
also be argued that first mover advantages should be extremely strong in the case of 
radically new products, as pioneers benefit from a temporary monopoly, the risk of 
imitation is lower, and the potential benefit from “branding” the new product with your 
brand name is high (Min et al, 2006). Empirical evidence on radically new products is 
scarce but later entrants outperformed early entrants in the case of the diagnostic imaging 
market (Mitchell, 1991) as well as for rigid disk drives (Christensen et al, 1998). 
 
II.3. The role of pre-entry experience  
Next to the mediating factor of the product’s degree of newness Capon (1978), Schnaars 
(1986) and Biggadike (1976) develop the argument that the long-term success within a 
market is not only a question of the order of entry, but moreover also depends on firm-
specific capabilities. According to their line of reasoning, entry at any point in time may 
lead to success, but entry at different stages of the product life cycle requires different 
capabilities. One famous example in this context is Du Pont which could enter as a late 
entrant into the Western Europe synthetic fiber industry as analyzed by Shaw and Shaw 
(1984). While all other later entrants withdrew from the market Du Pont could use its 
experience form the US market to establish a significant market share. 
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Additional empirical evidence for the influence of pre-entry experience on firm success 
was delivered by Klepper (2002) and Buenstorf (2007) for the US respectively German 
laser industry. In their population based investigation they showed that in both countries 
experienced entrants outperform less experienced competitors. In particular, they 
observed that diversifying firms as well as spin-offs proof to be longer-lived than de novo 
entrants without any prior experience. Dunne et al (1988) supports these findings and 
shows that de novo entrants are more frequent than diversifying entrants into the US 
manufacturing industry, but experienced firms outperformed their inexperienced 
competitors. Klepper and Simons (2000) as well as Thompson (2002) deliver additional 
empirical support for the relevance of pre-entry experience for the US television receiver 
industry and the early US shipbuilding market respectively. Within this discussion Helfat 
and Lieberman (2002) do not only differentiate between these different types of entrants 
but provide a comprehensive framework on the interrelation of different types of pre-
entry experience/capabilities of each of these entrant types, the market they ultimately 
choose to enter, as well as the mode of entry, the timing and subsequent success. Within 
their framework of capabilities they argue that firms can accumulate various types of 
experience and thus establish different types of capabilities, i.e. specialized and 
generalized capabilities similar to Teece (1980). Specialized capabilities are highly bound 
to a particular setting and are thus of limited use in a different context such as another 
industry. Specific R&D activities, industry-specific or region-specific knowledge, 
customer relations, patents, and brand names clearly fall into this category. In contrast 
generalized capabilities are useful in a broader set of environments and are represented 
by general organizational capabilities such as managerial or financial skills, the ability to 
coordinate multiple business units within a firm, or the ability to enter a new market and 
refocus the business activities respectively to integrate products into the existing product 
portfolio. Especially the last aspect is of crucial importance as it represents the interaction 
of the firm and a changing market environment, e.g. in terms of technological 
discontinuities, and is therefore referred to as dynamic capabilities (Teece and Pisano, 
1994). It represents a firm’s ability of timely responsiveness in terms of flexible product 
innovation as well as managerial competencies to appropriately adapt, integrate, and re-
configure internal and organizational competences and resources.     
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Given all these theoretical and empirical considerations, the paper at hand conducts a 
population-based survival analysis for the German machine tool market between 1949 
and 2002 and investigates the influence of order of entry and firm-specific pre-entry 
capabilities in the radically new product market for the industrial goods case of 
multifunctional machine tools.  
 
III. Empirical setting 
Today’s machine tool industry is one of the smallest sectors within manufacturing 
contributing only about 2% of the national industrial production (Arnold, 2003), it’s 
production equipment builds the technological foundation for the entire metalworking 
industry, and is thus of strategic importance in the industrialized world (Carlsson, 1989). 
Especially highly sophisticated industries such as automobiles, aircraft, military, and 
computers heavily rely on the machine tool industry (Ashburn, 1988). According to this 
diverse set of customers, the industry is marked by a high degree of product 
heterogeneity with respect to size, type, complexity and functionality (Sciberras and 
Payne, 1985). Furthermore, the industry is characterized by its high capital intensity, long 
reinvestment cycles (Arnold, 2003), and importance of international trade (Carlsson, 
1989). Lastly, the industry consists first and foremost of small and medium-sized firms, 
which are not heavily engaged in formal R&D activities (Sciberras and Payne, 1985), but 
instead rely on a strong manufacturer-user relationship as the main source of innovation 
(Lee, 1996; Hirsch- Kreinsen, 2000).  
Even though, the machine tool industry’s roots date back until the end of the 18th century 
it continuous to be subject to endogenous technological change. Especially throughout 
the second half of the 20th century demand conditions changed all over the place. In 
particular, the industry experienced a clear trend towards a buyer’s market with 
increasingly sophisticated customers asking for machines with stricter tolerance, higher 
precision and a high degree of automation (CEC Report, 1990). Among them the 
automobile industry as one of the major customers continuously enlarged its product 
portfolio and demanded increasingly flexible and versatile machine tools to produce a 
variety of models (Fleischer, 1997; Roy and McEvily, 2004). Additionally, small job 
shops were asking for increasingly adjustable machinery as their own development cycles 
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shortened and the pressure to minimize time to market, massively reduce costs, and to 
increase flexibility of production processes came to the fore (Hirsch-Kreinsen, 2000). 
This request for advanced flexible manufacturing became an overarching issue in the 
general international customer base and thus called for innovations dealing with these 
changing requirements. The development of numerical controls and their computerized 
successors1 served exactly this purpose and allowed, amongst other things, for the 
construction of multifunctional machinery and products such as machining centers, 
flexible manufacturing cells or even entire manufacturing systems2. These state of the art 
machining concepts integrate several single function-specific machines, e.g. for drilling, 
milling, and boring, thus rendering conventional standalone one function machines 
almost obsolete, technically speaking (Arnold, 2003). Despite the fact that the new 
machining concepts opened up a new product segment of metal processing tools within 
the machine tool industry, this innovation can be described as rather radical as the 
required capabilities to produce these integrated multifunctional machines strongly differ 
from the mechanical engineering tradition within the industry. In particular, whereas 
previously mechanical functions were designed around hardware constructions including 
fixtures, jigs and wires the new machining concepts were now built around electronic 
control equivalents (Wieandt, 1994). Thus, old accumulated technological capabilities, 
which guided the design and construction process of the predominately mechanical 
machine tools, were not necessarily useful in the new market segment. Furthermore, the 
accumulated knowledge with respect to the competitive landscape and industry setting 
remained only partly applicable after the technological change. The fusion of formerly 
independent submarkets of conventional single function standalone machines led to a 
new set of previously irrelevant competitors. On the other hand, new competencies, i.e. in 
electronics, were needed.  To be more precise, the understanding of the electronic 
                                                 
1 (Computerized) numerical controls operate the tools automatically with the help of computerized control 
tapes which contain pre-programmed sets of commands. All process relevant actions, such as machine feed 
and speed, selection of a particular tool, distance and direction are carried out automatically as opposed to a 
skilled worker continuously supervising the production processes. By changing the set of commands and 
thus the processing instructions an entirely different operation can be initiated (Arnold, 1997).  
2 A flexible manufacturing system (FMS) is defined as “ a grouping of CNC machines (often including 
machining centers) which is fed by an automatic materials handling and transfer system meeting the needs 
to manufacture small and medium batches of a variety of products” (CEC Report, 1990, p. 53). Flexible 
manufacturing cells (FMC) and machining centers are also based on CNC technology, but contain fewer 
machines/tools than FMS. 
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components and their interrelation with the performance of the machine tool replaced the 
accrued competencies in almost pure mechanical engineering (Mazzoleni, 1997; 
Stöckmann, 1969). This competence–destroying effect turned the international machine 
tool industry upside down and reopened the market (Arnold, 2003; Guenther, 2009). 
On the consumer side learning was required nearly to the same degree, as the previously 
manually guided work process was now replaced by software applications. In particular, 
instead of retooling a work process by physically changing the machine configuration and 
parameters, adjustments needed to be made via software reprogramming. Given these 
learning requirements on both sides, the technology underwent an evolutionary process 
itself with a major discontinuity at the beginning of the 1980s when the transition from 
numerically controlled machines towards computer integrated numerically controlled 
machines was implemented, and the full potential of the new technology could be 
realized. Moreover, as Europe’s manufacturing landscape was  reconstructed altogether 
after WW2, the rather long replacement cycles of 15 years (Arnold, 2003) did not allow 
smaller job shops for replacing their machines right away at the timing of the invention of 
multifunctional machine tools in the late 1960s (Fornahl und Guenther, 2008). Therefore, 
according to the definition of Urban et al. (1996) this market can be described as a 
radically new product market, even though demand for these products existed from the 
beginning.  
Figure 1 represents the lifecycle of this new market segment between 1969 and 2002. 
Whereas during the first 15 years the number of producer increases only slowly but 
steadily, the pace of growth accelerates from 1985 onwards leading to a peak number of 
producers of 62 in 1991. In 2002 the number has dropped to 45.  
Based on the theoretical framing of section II we investigate the order of entry as well as 
pre-entry experience in this radically new product segment. We expect first that industry-
specific pre-knowledge in terms of technological expertise does not enhance survival 
chances within the new product segment of multifunctional machine tools. Second, 
within this radically new product type pioneers are expected to be outperformed by later 
entrants, who are, given their delayed entry timing, less confronted with market 
uncertainties. On top of that, the delayed replacement cycle is expected to foster this 
tendency. Moreover, we hypothesize that firms possessing a higher degree of general 
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capabilities are more successful than less experienced firms as they, independent of the 
specific technological challenges, have already overcome their liability of newness. More 
specifically, we argue that firms which exhibit diversification and thus dynamic 
capabilities, have a higher likelihood of long-term survival within the new market as they 
already managed to reorganize their business activities and successfully integrated the 
production of additional products in their production processes and product portfolio.  
 
IV. Empirical estimation strategy and Data 
IV.1. Estimation strategy   
This just portrayed scenery builds the basis for the upcoming analysis. We will use data 
on the entire firm population of machine tool companies between 1936 and 2002 in order 
to estimate the effect of different types of pre-entry experience respectively capabilities 
on the hazard of exit within the new state of the art product market as well as the overall 
industry. The analysis will be carried out in three steps. First, we estimate the influence of 
the timing of entry, age as well as being an industry internal and external entrant on the 
probability to exit the newly entered product market. In a second set of estimations we 
additionally decompose the age effect into four types of capabilities, namely general, 
organizational, industry-specific and dynamic capabilities, and again test for their 
individual effects on the survival rates. Moreover, we investigate the intensity of this new 
business activity with respect to the overall product portfolio and test for its effect on the 
risk of failure. In a last set of estimations we take a broader perspective and change the 
level of analysis from this one specific new product market to the entire machine tool 
industry. We pose the question whether long term survival within the machine tool 
industry is systematically influenced by entering the new product market, i.e. whether it 
is necessary to keep track with the technological progress and refocus business activities 
towards these newly emerging products in order to ensure a company’s long term 
success.  
To analyze these three sets of estimations we apply the following simple proportional 
Cox hazard model (Cox, 1972): 
 
                   hi(t) = h0(t) exp(αe +  αr + αt + β1xi1 + β2xik + ・ ・ ・ + βkxik)                   (1) 
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with hi(t) being the hazard rate, i.e. the risk of failure, at time t of firm i conditional on a 
set of k firm-specific (time-varying) covariates xi1, …., xik. h0(t) represents an unspecified 
baseline hazard function and αe , and αr  each represent a set of dummies specifying the 
entry cohort and the location of firm i further specified below.  When estimating equation 
(1) we account for the fact that not all firms are closed down within the observation 
period, i.e. they do not experience a failure event and are thus right censored.   
αe  is a set of dummies differentiating the group of entrants into the new product market 
according to their timing of entry as being either pioneers, early-followers or late 
entrants. These dummies allow for entry-cohort specific variation within the baseline 
hazard. Accordingly, we define αr and αt as region-specific and year specific fixed effects 
in order to account for varying baseline hazards within regions and individual years thus 
capturing all observed and unobserved location and year related effects i.e. due to 
agglomeration externalities or industry-specific time trends such as industry lifecycle and 
business cycles respectively.  
The set of (time-varying) covariates includes firm-specific measures such as age, firm-
size, industry-experience, and diversification-experience as well as the number of new 
products, and relative business intensity within the new product market.  
Finally, from Model 10 onwards we additionally control for the specific type of new 
product a firm offers within the new market as well as the technology field a firm is 
active in apart from the new business activities, i.e. metal cutting, metal forming, or 
special purpose machinery. Thereby, we capture the remaining production-specific 
unobserved within-industry heterogeneity which results from the diverse set of customers 
being served, including the high degree of product heterogeneity with respect to size, 
type, complexity, and functionality of the various machine tools (Sciberras and Payne, 
1985). 
 
IV.2. Data 
The dataset for the upcoming analysis was constructed on the basis of the buyer’s guide 
Wer baut Maschinen (Who makes machinery) which has been issued annually since the 
1930s by the Verein Deutscher Maschinen- und Anlagenbau (VDMA; Association of 
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German machine tool producers). This source allows us to identify the entire firm 
population of West German machine tool producers between 1949 and 2002, a total of 
2,267 machine tool producers subject to the general definition of machine tools as being 
power-driven machines that are used to produce a given form of a work piece by cutting, 
forming, or shaping metal (Wieandt, 1994). Moreover, survival time of each individual 
firm can be traced as well as the composition of their annual product portfolio. Finally, 
extensive archival research was conducted to determine the respective year of foundation 
of the individual firms.    
For the paper at hand, we extract the following information from these sources. First of 
all, we record the overall observed survival time for each firm being defined as the time 
span between the first and last year of observation. Given that the beginning of our 
observation period in 1949 is not identical to the starting point of the industry we are 
aware of the fact that firms might have existed before the observation period starts, and 
were thus already exposed to the risk of failure before we start the analysis. In order to 
account for this we either include the exact year of firm foundation or as of Model 10 
onwards we use a dummy for “incumbency” of firms we already observed in the 
catalogues between 1936 and 1943 and the founding date is not known. Second, we 
collect the yearly product portfolio / business activities of each firm within the machine 
tool sector and thereby differentiate between innovators and non-innovators with respect 
to the new product market for multifunctional machine tools, and determine their 
respective years of entry and exit within this segment. Based on the entry years we define 
the following three entry cohorts for the new product market: 
 
1) Pioneers: all firms entering the market for multifunctional machine tools within   
                       the first two years of the markets’ existence, i.e. 1969 and 1970;3 
2) Early followers: all firms entering the market between 1971 and 1985; 
3) Late entrants: all firms entering the market after 1985. 
 
                                                 
3 Within the empirical analysis we allow for multiple first entrants and extent this definition to the group of 
early entrants. This rather practical definition refrains from taking into consideration if the pioneering 
entrant actually invented the technology or product category and patented it; we are only interested in the 
firm(s) offering/selling a product within the new product category first (cf Golder and Tellis, 1993). 
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This specific division was chosen as market pioneers should be defined as entrants which 
are confronted with an entirely new market in the sense that they could not have learnt 
about the market opportunity, competitive scenery, specific customers or from the failure 
of earlier entrants. Given the rather long development cycles within the machine tool 
sector of 3-5 years this situation is surely present within the first two years. Early 
followers on the contrary could have witnessed the entry of the pioneers into the new 
market and have decided to enter the market as a reaction and developed their own 
product within this segment. Moreover, this entry cohort can either copy the original 
product or modify the pioneers’ product and eliminate part of the witnessed 
shortcomings. Late entrants are defined as entrants joining the new product market in the 
late growth phase when firms start offering different product versions of the emerged 
standard.  
As a third step we additionally compile four firm-specific pre-entry variables for the 
group of innovators in order to measure their starting conditions, i.e. their set of 
capabilities, before entering the new product market segment: 
 
General capabilities: 
a) Age: defined by the number of years between the year of foundation and the entry 
year; 
b) Size before entry: approximated by the number of submarkets a firm is active in 
one year before it enters the new product market (Klepper and Thompson, 2006); 
c) Dynamic capabilities: whether or not a firm has previously diversified into 
another machine tool product market between 1949 and the year of entry into the 
new market segment under investigation. 
 
Specific capabilities: 
d) Industry experience: defined by the number of years a firm has been active in 
the machine tool industry between 1936 and the year of entry into the new 
product market; 
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V. Analysis: Survival in the new product market and on the industry level 
V.1. Survival in the new product market  
The initial set of models in Table 1 investigates all 130 identified entrants in the new 
product market with respect to the different hazards to exit (only within this new field of 
business activities) based on the timing of entry and three additional firm-specific 
background variables. Starting with the question whether the timing of entry influences 
survival patterns within this market we differentiate between three entry-cohorts, namely 
pioneers (1969-1970), early followers (1971- 985), and late entrants (after 1985). Thus, 
as a first step Model 1 shows the estimation results examining only the influence of entry 
timing on the hazard to exit with late entrants serving as the reference group.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Within Model 1 and all following models we control for region specific fixed effects in 
order to capture the unobserved initial heterogeneity with respect to the entrants’ 
location. On top of that, year specific fixed effects account for industry specific time 
trends such as the industry lifecycle or business cycles. The coefficient estimates in 
Model 1 show that pioneers have a significantly higher hazard to exit as compared to late 
entrants whereas early followers are not statistically distinguishable form the reference 
group with respect to their survival chances. Given the empirical setting, this result can 
be explained by the fact that first of all, the new market segment represents a radical 
innovation. Secondly, early entrants might have been unable to establish high market 
shares as demand was rather low in the beginning as machinery equipment has just been 
renewed during the 1950s and 1960s and therefore replacement cycles were rather 
unfavorable during the early 1970s. Thus, even though pioneers have identified the 
technological window of opportunity this was not accompanied by a prosperous market 
opportunity. Third, given the technological discontinuities within the new product 
segment itself, producers entering the market in the early 1980s could benefit from the 
transition of numerically controlled to computer numerically controlled multifunctional 
machine tools.   
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In Model 2 we additionally control for a first firm-specific background variable dubbed 
“traditionals”, indicating whether the entrant has been traditionally active within the 
machine tool industry in general before entering the new product market under 
investigation. This dummy gives a first impression of whether industry or technology 
specific knowledge affects the survival chances of firms within the new market. The 
results show that the group of 103 traditional machine tool producers does not outperform 
entrants without any prior machine tool experience. As in Model 1 only the timing of 
entry influences the hazard to exit and favors the group of early followers as well as late 
entrants. These first results support the conjecture that in radically new product markets 
pioneers do not necessarily benefit from their head start. Moreover, the technological pre-
knowledge of traditional machine tool builders does not lead to a significant competitive 
advantage. 
Model 3 introduces the age of the entrant as a second firm-specific background measure, 
with age being defined as years that a company existed before entering the new market. 
Estimation results show that the older the entrant before entering the new market, the 
lower the hazard to exit. Moreover, now as we control for age, the group of early 
followers has a statistically significant higher risk of failure than late entrants, while 
pioneers remain having the lowest survival chances in the new market.  
In Model 4 we additionally control for the number of products each of the entrants offers 
within the new market over time. The estimated coefficient turns out to be negative, thus 
lowering the hazard of exit the more products a firm offers within the new market, but 
this effect is statistically insignificant. In an unreported model we also tested whether it 
makes a difference which of the new products is offered, but similar to the number of 
products we did not find any significant difference between the individual products.    
 
V.2. Survival in the new product market of traditional machine tool builders 
The second set of models in Table 2 gets involved into a more detailed analysis of the 
different types of capabilities which influence the survival rate of companies entering the 
new product market. Within Model 5 to Model 11 only the group of 103 traditional 
machine tool builders is investigated as data limitations do not allow for analyzing any 
type of pre-experience of the 27 external entrants except for age. Again we control for 
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region and year specific fixed effects and take the group of late entrants as our reference 
group in the estimation.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Model 5 replicates Model 1 for the subset of entrants consisting of only traditional 
machine tool builders, and confirms that pioneers exhibit the highest failure rate as 
compared to both types of later entrants. Within Model 6 we start testing for the effect of 
the various types of capabilities which entrants posses one year before offering a machine 
tool within the new product market. Similar to Model 3 the influence of age is estimated 
as it is used in previous studies to capture the effect of any type of experience a company 
gained throughout its lifetime. Also for the subset of entering traditional machine tool 
builders a risk decreasing effect of an additional year of existence can be confirmed as 
well as a lower hazard rate attributed to the early follower and late entry cohort.  
The subsequent models 7-9 are devoted to decomposing the “one catches all” experience 
measure age and to differentiate further between various qualities of experience a 
company makes throughout its lifetime, i.e. to isolate the influence of general, 
organization and coordination related capabilities from industry-specific capabilities as 
explained in section II. 
In Model 7 we therefore add a measure for firm size in order to tell apart the influence of 
general capabilities captured by age and the effect assigned to organizational and 
management related capabilities on the risk of failure.4 The estimation coefficients reveal 
that the firm size at the time of entry does not significantly lower the hazard to exit while 
leaving the effects of timing of entry as well as for age unchanged. Thus, a company’s 
capability to coordinate more business activities within the machine tool sector than a 
specialized competitor does not increase its survival chance when entering the new 
product market in question.  
                                                 
4 Similar to Klepper and Thompson (2006) we only observe firm activities within the industry under 
investigation, in this case machine tools. If a firm is active in other (probably related) industries, we do not 
account for this part of the product portfolio. But as this industry is marked by small and medium-sized 
specialized companies we assume that our measure includes their main business activities. 
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The influence of technological expertise, industry-relevant knowledge as well as existing 
customer relationships within the machine tool industry is now examined in Model 8. 
This set of specific capabilities is approximated by the years of experience within the 
machine tool sector before entering the new product market. Similar to the results of 
Model 2 where we did not find any advantage for traditional machine tool producers over 
external entrants, there is no significant influence to be observed for companies that have 
additional years of experience within the machine tool industry before entering the new 
product segment as it was expected in this radically new product market. 
Finally, Model 9 investigates the question whether entrants that have already managed to 
diversify into a new product market within the machine tool industry before entering the 
submarket under investigation, systematically outperform competitors which do not have 
successfully diversified into a new submarket previously. This diversification experience 
is accounted for by a dummy variable separating experienced from non-experienced 
entrants. This type of experience is used as a proxy for dynamic capabilities, as the 
introduction of a new product requires a firm to be able to recognize and analyze the 
market beyond its own current business activities, develop a new technological solution 
and to introduce it to the market. Thus, the firm adapts to the competitive environment 
and redirects and broadens current business activities including changes within the 
production and organization of the new product portfolio. The estimation reveals that 
having already managed to diversify into another product market within the machine tool 
industry at least once significantly lowers the hazard to exit within the present new 
market segment. In addition we estimated an unreported model including the rate of 
failure of these diversification endeavors, i.e. in how many of these previously entered 
new product segments the respective firm is still active in, but this variable turned out to 
be insignificant.  
Model 10 and 11 dwell a little deeper into the actual business activities within the new 
market and its relation to the rest of the companies’ product portfolio. More specifically, 
Model 10 includes the number of products a company offers within the new market over 
time, and controls for the different versions of the new product. In Model 11 we 
additionally test whether companies that strongly refocus their business activities towards 
the new product market over time have a disadvantage as compared to companies with a 
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more diversified product portfolio. This business intensity within the new segment is 
simply measured by the share of products within the new product market within the entire 
product portfolio over time. Whereas the actual number of products does not lead to 
significant differences in survival chances of entrants, the stronger the focus / 
specialization on this new market the higher the risk of failure. 
Consistent with our prior models survival chances increase the later a company enters the 
market. Moreover, the decomposition of the one catches all capability variable age 
reveals that the risk of failure in the radically new product market under investigation is 
only significantly influenced by a firm’s dynamic capability to coordinate the integration 
of additional business activities into the current product portfolio. Industry-specific 
capabilities as well as general abilities in terms of age and size do not lead to a lower 
hazard of exit. Moreover, in line with the simple risk-spreading argument, we find that a 
narrow focus on the new business activities substantially increases the probability to exit 
the new market.  
 
V.3. Survival on the industry level: entrants versus non-entrants 
Model 11 already dealt with the question of how the new product market relates to the 
rest of the companies business activities within the machine tool industry, but has so far 
only been looked upon with respect to firms that actually enter the new product market. 
The question now arises whether a company necessarily has to enter this state of the art 
submarket in order to ensure overall long-term survival within the machine tool sector. 
Therefore, we estimated a last set of models in Table 3 comparing first of all the overall 
hazard of exit of firms entering the new market with machine tool producers which do 
not enter.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Model 12 shows that firms entering the new product market (“inventor”) have a 
significantly lower hazard of exit as compared to the reference group of not entering 
firms. Moreover, we find that experienced firms, i.e. incumbents, outperform newly 
founded firms as well as larger firms exhibiting higher survival rates than smaller 
19
 #0922 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
competitors. In a second step, Model 13, we again differentiate between the three entry-
cohorts as in the previous models. As not all founding dates are known, we cannot use the 
exact firm age within these estimations. Instead, we split the population into incumbents, 
i.e. companies which were observed already before 1949, and newly founded firms after 
1949. Thus, we are restricted to the use of a very broad measure of capabilities for these 
two estimations. Size is again approximated by the number of submarkets a company is 
active in. Moreover, we control for the technological field of activity of each firm, 
distinguishing producers of metal cutting or forming machine tools as well as machine 
tools for special purpose machinery in order to capture effects related to the overall 
technology life cycles within these groups of producers. Region and year specific fixed 
effects are again included in the estimations.  
The closer look at the different entry-cohorts in Model 13 shows that not all entrants into 
the state of the art product market demonstrate superior survival rates as compared to 
non-entrants. Only early-followers as well as late entrants display a lower risk of failure; 
pioneering entrants are statistically not distinguishable in their survival patterns from 
companies that did not enter the new product segment in their overall survival pattern. 
Thus, it is not per se beneficial to enter this market for state of the art products as the 
pioneers’ disadvantage lowers the survival rate to the level of non-entering firms. But this 
also implies that the group of pioneers is not worse off by entering the new market as 
compared to their non-entering competitors. Further investigations should concentrate on 
comparing the characteristics of the different entry cohorts as well as non-entering firms. 
Thereby possible systematic differences between these individual groups can be detected 
which influence their survival, e.g. whether a certain type of firms tends to pioneer in the 
new market while another type of firms, e.g. larger and older firms are more likely to 
belong to the group of early followers.         
 
VI. Conclusion 
The question of which factors influence the success of firms entering a new market has 
been subject to extensive research within management and economics studies. In this 
context theoretical as well as empirical studies deliver ambiguous results in terms of 
finding support for either the existence of a first mover advantage or the phenomenon of 
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pioneers’ burnout where later entrants outperform early movers. Despite these results, 
three important factors have been identified that influence the likelihood of firm success 
within newly emerging markets. Besides the order of entry product characteristics, i.e. 
whether the new product market represents an incremental or radically new innovation, 
as well as firm-specific capabilities in terms of different types of pre-entry experience 
affect individual firms’ survival chance. The paper at hand contributes to the empirical 
literature by conducting a population-based survival analysis for the German machine 
tool industry by analyzing hazard rates of different entry cohorts in the radically new 
market for multifunctional machine tools incorporating the effect of specific and 
generalized capabilities. The Cox estimations show that general capabilities lower the 
risk of failure whereas as specific technological pre-experience does not affect the 
likelihood of long-term success within the new product segment. It turns out that when 
decomposing the set of general capabilities it is no longer the pure fact of being older and 
larger that lowers a firm’s risk of failure, but it is particularly the experience of having 
managed to integrate a new business activity into the product portfolio, and thus dynamic 
capabilities, that increase survival chances in the market under investigation. Moreover, 
we find that later entrants benefit from technological discontinuities within the new 
market as well as a delayed replacement cycle within the industry and are thus able to 
outperform pioneering entrants. Future research on this as well as other empirical settings 
should concentrate on overcoming current limitations of the analysis. For the case at 
hand, it is so far unexplored whether the group of entrants systematically differs from 
those machine tool companies that did not decide to enter the newly emerging market. 
Whereas this potential selection bias could be overcome as all potential entrants from 
within the machine tool industry are known, there is no way of analyzing the entire set of 
potential entrants outside of the machine tool industry without establishing long-term 
population based datasets for other industries as well. For the time being the presented 
study on industrial goods nonetheless delivers a valuable empirical contribution and 
highlights the fact that first mover advantages can be overruled by experienced late 
comers who enter a new market after technological discontinuities were largely solved 
and customers were willing and able to replace their older equipment.   
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Appendix: 
 
 
Figure 1: Number of machine tool producers in the new submarket for multifunctional 
machine tools, 1969-2002. 
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Table 1: Exit hazards for all entrants into the new product market  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Pioneers 1.916** 1.938** 2.059** 2.099** 
 (.862) (.858) (.837) (.835) 
Early_followers .904 .913 1.40* 1.036* 
 (.581) (.580) (.538) (.535) 
Traditionals  -.213 .192 .220 
  (.495) (.564) (.562) 
Age   -.012** -.011** 
   (.006) (.006) 
# products    -.253 
    (.243) 
     
Region dummy yes yes yes yes 
Year dummy yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1270 1270 1270 1270 
Subjects 130 130 130 130 
Failures 83 83 83 83 
Log-likelihood -284.359 -284.244 -281.03 -280.420 
Prob>chi2 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Note: Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by firm) in parentheses; 
*** p ≤ .01; ** p ≤ .05; * p ≤ .10 
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Table 2: Exit hazards for traditional machine tool companies in the new product market 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Pioneers 2.291** 2.419** 2.646** 2.647** 2.800** 2.934** 3.014** 
 (1.049) (1.028) (1.080) (1.082) (1.124) (1.150) (1.216) 
Early_followers 1.076 1.289* 1.422* 1.418* 1.527** 1.417* 1.534* 
 (.746) (.701) (.776) (.781) (.764) (.848) (.819) 
Age  -.011* -.010* -.010 -.011* -.009 -.009 
  (.007) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) 
Size   -.0532 -.050 -.027 -.027 -.008 
   (.065) (.066) (.063) (.072) (.067) 
Industry_exp    -.006 .019 .018 .014 
    (.021) (.023) (.022) (.023) 
Diversi_exp    -1.168* -1.271* -1.268* 
     (.686) (.689) (.681) 
# products      .547 .382 
      (.461) (.512) 
intensity       2.659*** 
       (.991) 
        
Prod dummy no no no no no yes yes 
Region dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1102 1102 1102 1102 1102 1102 1102 
Subjects 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 
Failures 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 
Log-likelihood -201.149 -198.811 -198.036 -197.973 -196.542 -193.502 -190.254 
Prob>chi2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Note: Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by firm) in parentheses; 
*** p ≤ .01; ** p ≤ .05; * p ≤ .10 
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Table 3: Exit hazards for all machine tool producers aggregated on industry level 
 Model 12 Model 13 
inventor -.887***  
 (.123)  
Inv_pioneer  -.167 
  (.200) 
Inv_early_follower -.560*** 
  (.162) 
inv_late_entry  -1.219*** 
  (.187) 
incumbent -.564*** -.569*** 
 (.060) (.060) 
size .-143*** -.145*** 
 (.018) (.018) 
   
Technolgie dummy yes yes 
Region dummy yes yes 
Year dummy yes yes 
Observations 35505 35505 
Subjects 2267 2267 
Failures 1896 1896 
Log-likelihood -12550.975 -12546.319 
Prob>chi2 .000 .000 
Note: Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by firm) in parentheses; 
*** p ≤ .01; ** p ≤ .05; * p ≤ .10 
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